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CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN JAPAN 
Nobuhisa Ishizukm 
INTRODUCTION 
Over seventy years ago it would have seemed inconceivable in 
the aftermath of a calamitous war that a complete reorientation of Japan 
into a pacifist society, modeled on Western principles of individual 
rights and democracy, would succeed in upending a deeply entrenched 
political order with roots dating back centuries.2 
The post-war Japanese constitution lies at the heart of this 
transformation. Drafted, negotiated and promulgated a mere fourteen 
months after Japan's formal surrender, 3 it has remained a model of 
stability amidst transformational changes in the domestic and 
international political landscape. 4 In the seventy-plus years since its 
adoption, it has not been amended once.s 
1 Executive Director, Center for Japanese Legal Studies, and Lecturer in Law, 
Columbia Law School. The author would like to acknowledge the research assistance 
of Nicole Frey, Columbia Law School LL.M. '19. 
2 See Hideo Tanaka, The Conflict Between Two Legal Traditions in Making the 
Constitution of Japan [hereinafter, "Tanaka, Legal Traditions"], in DEMOCRATIZING 
JAPAN: THE ALLIED OCCUPATION 107-26 (Robert E. Ward & Yoshikazu Sakamoto 
eds., 1987) [hereinafter, "DEMOCRATIZING JAPAN"] (describing how the Japanese 
tradition of constitutional scholarship posed obstacles to the recognition and 
acceptance of the liberal ideals sought to be imposed upon Japan after the war, and 
how "ideas that were totally foreign to Japanese tradition [have] taken root and become 
part of Japan's political culture"). 
3 Hideo Tanaka, A History of the Constitution of Japan of 1946, in THE JAPANESE 
LEGAL SYSTEM 654-64 (H. Tanaka & M. Smith, eds., 1976) [hereinafter, "Tanaka, 
Constitutional History"]. 
4 Kenneth Mori McElwain, What do Japanese People Want from Their Constitution? 
(paper prepared for the Conference on Constitutional Reform in Japan at Columbia 
Law School (March 13, 2019), copy on file with the author, 1) [hereinafter, 
"McElwain"] ("[t]he Constitution of Japan is the oldest unamended constitution in the 
world."). 
s In contrast, the German Basic Law has been amended 60 times since 1949; the 
French Constitution has been amended 24 times since 1958; and the U.S. Constitution 
has been amended 18 times-six times since the end of World War II. Takeshi Inoue, 
The Constitution of Japan and Constitutional Reform, 23 ASIA-PACIFIC REV. 7 (2016) 
[hereinafter, "Inoue, Japan Constitution"]. 
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Yet despite its apparent stability, inherent structural tensions 
surrounded it from the moment of inception. Given the innovations of 
the document, the unfamiliar nature of many of the principles set forth 
within it, the manner of its adoption and the controversy over its origins, 
the real question behind the current constitutional reform debates is not 
whether it should be amended, but why it has not already been so.6 
From the Japanese perspective, not only have the Japanese been 
able to live with and adapt a wholly alien instrument of national 
governance, "functioning under its terms [they] presided over one of the 
most amazing political and economic recoveries in modern history."7 
From the U.S. perspective, the Japanese constitution essentially 
remodeled an ancient and complex civilization, with a history wholly at 
odds with that of the U.S., into a society governed by the U.S.'s 
universalist values.s For casual observers on both sides, the Japanese 
people have every reason to be satisfied with the document. 
However, the process of adaptation has prompted debates on 
fundamental questions of national purpose and identity, and over time 
its structural gaps and weaknesses have been bridged by a complex mix 
of legislative action, bureaucratic implementation and judicial 
interpretation.9 The current debates around constitutional revision can 
only be fully understood through a recognition of the document's 
competing, sometimes conflicting, legacies. 
This article seeks to explain the origins of Japan's constitutional 
reform debate, presents a view of what that debate reveals about the 
social, political and legal tensions that the document has generated, and 
explores their significance to ongoing attempts to redefine Japan's role 
in Asia and beyond.10 As shown below, strains of early modern social 
6 Robert E. Ward, The Commission on the Constitution and Prospects for 
Constitutional Change in Japan, 24 J. ASIAN STUD. 402 (1965) [hereinafter, "Ward, 
Constitution Commission"]. 
1 Id. at 402-03. 
8 KENNETH B. PYLE, JAPAN IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY 110 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2018) [hereinafter, "PYLE, AMERICAN CENTURY"]. General 
Douglas A. MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, stated it was 
"probably the single most important accomplishment of the occupation." DOUGLAS 
MACARTHUR, REMINISCENCES 302 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964) 
[hereinafter, "REMINISCENCES"]. 
9 See KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR'S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1991) ( describing and analyzing the Diet debates of the 
constitution's provisions governing religious freedom, the Emperor and individual 
dignity). See also infra text at notes 60-80. 
10 This article is not intended to present a new theory of Japanese constitutionalism, 
nor does it conduct a deep dive into, nor provide a complete description of the scope 
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and political conservatism (which in tum have their roots in pre-
industrial Japan) have not disappeared as a result of the reforms imposed 
by the constitution. They have revealed themselves during 
constitutional reform debates in various forms and at various times 
during the post-war period. For those seeking to understand Japan's 
responses to a changing global order, the significance of this is two-fold. 
First, significant domestic tensions between opposing social and 
political groups with fundamentally different views of Japan's role in 
Asia and the world have underlied the process of adaptation. 
Notwithstanding that the document's principles are firmly embedded in 
the public consciousness and are largely functioning effectively, this 
masks potentially damaging confrontations between opposing camps 
separated by a wide philosophical gulf 
Second, the constitution's reorientation of Japan along pacifist 
ideals has intimately aligned the country with the U.S., particularly in 
security matters, which has constrained Japan's ability to chart an 
independent path on foreign policy. The current debates around 
constitutional reform-in an environment vastly different from the one 
in which the document originated-illustrate the struggle between 
opposing views of Japan's larger identity and purpose. 
ORIGINS OF THE DOCUMENT 
Technically an amendment to the 1889 Meiji Constitution, the 
current constitution was never put to a direct popular vote or 
referendum. u The Meiji Constitution itself, promulgated as a gift of the 
of, contemporaneous social, economic and political life in which adaptive responses 
to the document were undertaken. 
11 Theodore H. McNelly, Induced Revolution: The Policy and Process of 
Constitutional Reform in Occupied Japan [hereinafter, "McNelly, Constitutional 
Reform"], in DEMOCRATIZING JAPAN, supra note 2, at 27 (" .. . proposals ... that the 
proposed constitution be deliberated on by . . . a constituent assembly and then be 
submitted to a popular referendum were successfully resisted .... "); Ward, 
Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 403 ("it is ... difficult to attach much 
importance to the debates and voting which led to the acceptance of the constitution 
by the Imperial Diet and Privy Council," noting the difficulty in assessing Japanese 
public opinion when the new constitution was under consideration amidst the post-war 
chaos, economic desperation and absolute authority of the Allied Occupation). Under 
the procedures at the time, promulgation only required the Imperial Order of the 
Emperor with Imperial Diet approval. DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPO [MEIJI KENPO] 
[MEIJI CONSTITUTION], art. 73 (1889) (the "Meiji Constitution"). 
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Emperor to the people, has also never been put to a popular vote.12 As 
a result, to this day, Japan has never had a popularly approved governing 
document for the nation. 
The first draft of the current constitution ( eventually adopted 
substantially as presented to the Japanese government by U.S. 
authorities) was created by teams of U.S. military and civilian officials 
in the Government Section of the General Headquarters ("GHQ") of the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers ("SCAP").13 None of the 
U.S. individuals involved in drafting it were experts in constitutional 
law.14 After rejecting an initial draft presented to it by the Japanese 
government, SCAP created its own version over eight days. is It was 
accepted in principle by the Japanese government ten days later and was 
debated by the Imperial Diet and negotiated between the government 
and GHQ over the ensuing eight months.16 
A number of issues have been raised about the circumstances 
surrounding its adoption. Scholars have raised questions about the 
scope of authority of the occupying forcesl7 and the appropriate level of 
foreign government involvement in the domestic political affairs of 
occupied territories under international law, 1s citing the self-
12 Toshiyoshi Miyasawa, Kem po [The Constitution], in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 
683-84 [hereinafter "Miyasawa"]. 
13 See infra notes 14-16. 
14 See Robert E. Ward, The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 AM. POL. 
Ser. REV. 980, 994 (1956) [hereinafter, "Ward, Origins"] ("none appears to have 
specialized in constitutional law"); see also OSAMU NISHI, TEN DAYS INSIDE GENERAL 
HEADQUARTERS 43-45 (Tokyo: Seibundo, 1987) (showing, however, that a number 
of the drafters had legal or other advanced degrees and one had been a U.S. Member 
of Congress). 
1s Tanaka, Constitutional History, supra note 3, at 660. 
16 For a general overview of the creation process, see id, at 653-81; Theodore H. 
McNelly, Domestic and International Influences on Constitutional Revision in Japan, 
1945-1946 (Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, 1952); KENZO TAKAYANAGI ET 
AL. EDS., NIHONKOKU KENPO SEITEI NO KATEI, 2 Vols. (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1972) 
[hereinafter, "TAKAYANAGI ET AL."]; Ward, Origins, supra note 14, at 980-1010; 
JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT 346-404 (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1999) [hereinafter, 'DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT"]. 
11 Ward, Origins, supra note 14, at 981. Japan was under the military occupation of 
the allied forces, under the executive authority of SCAP, for seven years. Reformation 
of its political system was a condition of their withdrawal. See infra note 22 and text 
at note 30. 
1s Harold S. Quigley, Revising the Japanese Constitution, 38 FOREIGN AFF. 140, 142 
(1959) [hereinafter, "Quigley, Revising the Constitution"]; MEIRON AND SUSIE 
HARRIES, SHEATHING THE SWORD 87-88 (New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1987). 
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determination principles of the Atlantic Charter,19 the UN Charter,20 the 
Hague Convention,21 and the Potsdam Declaration.22 Questions also 
have arisen about the speed with which the Japanese government was 
compelled to accept the U.S. draft, 23 the appropriate scope of the 
Supreme Commander's authority in dictating its contents 24 and the 
coercive manner in which it was adopted.2s 
19 Atlantic Charter, U.K.-U.S., Aug. 14, 1941 ("Third, [the U.S. and the United 
Kingdom] respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of govermnent under 
which they will live ... "). 
20 U.N. Charter, ch. XI, art. 73, Oct. 24, 1945 ("Members of the United Nations which 
have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have 
not yet attained a full measure of self-govermnent recognize the principle that the 
interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount ... and, to this end: ... to 
develop self-govermnent, to take due account of the political aspirations of the 
peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political 
institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its 
peoples .... "). 
21 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Annex to the Convention art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 ("The authority of the 
legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall 
take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order 
and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country.") 
22 "Proclamation Calling for the Surrender of Japan, approved by the Heads of 
Govermnents of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom," July 26, 1945 
(the "Potsdam Declaration"). Paragraph 12 states: "The occupying forces of the Allies 
shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as ... there has been established in accordance 
with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and 
responsible govermnent." Id. at para. 12. 
23 Ward, Origins, supra note 14, at 986 ("one is constantly troubled by the question of 
pace and timing [in the series of steps leading to the adoption of the constitution]"). 
24 See Courtney Whitney, Memorandum for the Supreme Commander: Subject: 
Constitutional Reform, February 1, 1946, (reproduced in 1 T AKAYANAGIET AL., supra 
note 16, at 90-98) (addressing the power of the Supreme Commander to approve or 
disapprove Japanese govermnent proposals or issue orders or directives to the 
govermnent in connection with fundamental changes to the constitution, "in the 
absence of any policy decision by the Far Eastern Commission on the subject (which 
would, of course, be controlling), you have the same authority with reference to 
constitutional reform as you have with reference to any other matter of substance in 
the occupation and control of Japan"). 
2s For a critical view of these matters, see Ward, Origins, supra note 14, at 980-1010. 
The rush to create and have Japan adopt the new constitution has been attributed to 
SCAP's concerns about the impending operational start of the Far Eastern 
Commission (FEC) at the end of February 1946, after which it would lose exclusive 
jurisdiction over the issue. Craig Martin, The Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional 
Amendment and the 'Reinterpretation' of Japan's War Powers, 40 FORDHAM INT'L 
L.J. 427, 463 (2017) [hereinafter, "Martin, Informal Amendment"]; Tanaka, 
Constitutional History, supra note 3, at 657-58; TAKAYANAGI ET AL., supra note 16, 
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Japanese political leaders were concerned about preserving the 
institution of the Emperor and as much of the pre-war social and 
political order as possible.26 At the same time, Japan was entirely reliant 
on the U.S. and its allies for economic assistance, security and the 
goodwill necessary to rebuild its standing in the world community.27 
This gave SCAP significant leverage to implement its vision of a new 
democratic order for the country while it had a free hand-before the 
Far Eastern Commission (the "FEC"), 2s which counted among its 
members China and the Soviet Union, could be in position to impose a 
far different, more punitive, agenda.29 
Personalities undoubtedly played a role in the adoption process, 
which has contributed to the controversy over the document's origins. 
General Douglas A. MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers, was a strong proponent of constitutional reform as a necessary 
condition for Japan to not only satisfy the conditions of the Potsdam 
Declaration (which in turn was a precondition to the end of the Allied 
Occupation), but also to completely pacify and transform the political 
at xxiv-xxv. MacArthur attributed the timing to a desire for the voting in elections 
scheduled to be held on April 10, 1946 to be a plebiscite on the new constitution. 
REMINISCENCES, supra note 8, at 300. 
26 Tanaka, Constitutional History, supra note 3, at 656; Offer of Surrender from 
Japanese Government, August 10, 1945 (Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII, No. 
320, Aug. 12, 1945) (accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration "with the 
understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which 
prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler"); 1 THE POLITICAL 
REORIENTATION OF JAPAN, REPORT OF GoVERNMENT SECTION, SUPREME 
COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS 98-101 (Government Printing Office, 1951) 
[hereinafter, "POLITICAL REORIENTATION"] (stating that the initial Japanese 
government draft of the revised constitution "do[es] not go beyond the most modest 
of modifications in the language of the Meiji constitution. The basic nature of the 
Japanese state is left unchanged ... the authority and powers of the Emperor are not 
altered or weakened in any real way"). 
21 See Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 403 (discussing how these 
factors constrained post-war political leaders from advocating openly for 
constitutional change during the Allied Occupation). 
2s The body formed to provide an allied role in policy making for Japan, it was to fall 
into ineffectiveness in the face of the policy-making power of the U.S. and the 
executive power granted to the Supreme Commander. DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT 
THE CREATION 427-28 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969). 
29 Letter to Jiro Shirasu, Assistant to Foreign Minister, from Brig. Gen. Courtney 
Whitney (February 16, 1946) (reproduced in 1 TAKAYANAGI ET AL., supra note 16, at 
346) (" ... the matter of constitutional reform in Japan is not confined to the exclusive 
interest of the Japanese people or even . . . the Supreme Commander . . . it is quite 
possible that a constitution might be forced upon Japan from the outside which would 
render the term 'drastic' as used by you ... far too moderate a term .... "). 
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and social structure of the country. 30 And, he was determined to do so 
without interference from either the bureaucracy in Washington or its 
allies.31 
General MacArthur's Japanese counterparts in the negotiations 
were pre-war political liberals, socially conservative in disposition and 
outlook, seeking to preserve values and practices that could be portrayed 
(and were viewed by many) as reversions to a discredited, conservative 
pre-war Meiji political system.32 Yet, they had virtually no means to 
reject the reforms imposed on Japan by the U.S. authoritieS.33 They 
were instead compelled to present the document to the public as a 
Japanese-originated and -endorsed instrument of political and social 
transformation. 34 During the eight-month negotiation process there 
were opportunities to add language and to clarify, adapt and conform 
certain provisions to Japanese linguistic, social and political norms.3s 
But they had no ability to alter the fundamental foundations of the new 
political and social order it established.36 
30 POLITICAL REORIENTATION, supra note 26, at 90-91 ("[MacArthur] clearly 
recognized at the outset that no political reform that did not encompass revision of the 
constitution would be worth serious consideration."; "MacArthur pointedly advised 
the new Prime Minister that the reforms which Japan must undertake 'will 
unquestionably involve a revision of the Constitution."'); REMINISCENCES, supra note 
8, at 299 ("a new charter was immediately imperative if the structure of Japanese self-
govermnent was to be sustained"). 
31 See 2 DALE M. HELLEGERS, WE, THE JAPANESE PEOPLE 436-37 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001) ("MacArthur learned not to trust Washington or let it in on its 
plans but to present a string offaits accomplis that could not easily be undone without 
undoing the Occupation"); see also Robert E. Ward, Presurrender Planning: 
Treatment of the Emperor and Constitutional Changes, in DEMOCRATIZING JAPAN, 
supra note 2, at 27-28 (suggesting that MacArthur's deliberate failure to convey 
Washington D.C.'s guidelines for constitutional revision to Japanese drafters invited 
a Japanese draft that would prove to be unacceptable to the U.S., providing the pretext 
for occupation officials to intervene with its own draft). 
32 Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 417. 
33 Inoue, Japan Constitution, supra note 5, at 5-6 ("[t]he end product may have 
included independent contributions by members of the Imperial Diet ... but GHQ had 
to sign off on every proposed modification and never allowed Japanese law makers to 
deviate from the basic principles it had originally set forth."). 
34 Jd. at 28-29; DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT, supra note 16, at 383-87. 
35 See infra text at note 63; see also COLIN P.A. JONES & FRANKS. RAVITCH, THE 
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 162 (West Academic Publishing 2018) [hereinafter, "JONES 
& RA VITCH"] ( citing examples of provisions that were included during the deliberative 
process). 
36 Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 409. 
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOCUMENT 
The post-war constitution completely inverted the political 
structure that had existed during the pre-war Meiji era.37 Under the 
Meiji Constitution, political power was exercised by oligarchs who 
emerged from the lower strata of the ruling class that had existed in 
Japan from the early 17th century.3s While making some concessions to 
strong democratic impulses that arose among the population during the 
initial period of the Meiji Restoration,39 the oligarchs retained almost 
complete political and social control through the legislative and judicial 
structures they created.4o 
The post-war constitution upended this structure by establishing 
democracy, individual rights and pacifism as core governing principles 
for the country.41 In addition to establishing the popularly elected Diet 
as the supreme law-making organ of state,42 the document stripped the 
former ruling class of their status and powers. 43 It also expressly 
elevated universal human rights to a constitutionally protected statuS,44 
established co-equal legislative, executive and judicial branches of 
government, 45 and mandated the permanent disarmament of the 
country.46 
37 Miyasawa, supra note 12, at 683 ("the legal nature of [the] change [which 
established the principle of popular sovereignty "in spite of, or in violation of, the 
Meiji Constitution"] was revolutionary"); Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 
6, at 401. 
38 Hugh Borton, Past Limitations and the Future of Democracy in Japan, 70 POL. Ser. 
Q. 410-11 (Sep. 1955) [hereinafter, "Borton, Democracy in Japan"]; Sylvia Brown 
Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The Japanese 
Constitution and Human Rights, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415, 421-26 (1999) [hereinafter, 
"Hamano, Constitution and Human Rights"]. 
39 Hamano, Constitution and Human Rights, supra note 38, at 423 ("[t]he Meiji 
oligarchs ... understood that the powerful forces pressing from below for social and 
political revolution could not be ignored"). 
40 See Borton, Democracy in Japan, supra note 38, at 410-11. At the center of the 
governmental structure they created was the Emperor, under whose broad policies they 
operated and under whose legal sanction they exercised wide powers. Id. at 410. 
41 See HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 29-30 (noting these as "fundamental principles 
underlying the constitution") (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 2009); 
McNelly, Constitutional Reform, supra note 11, at 98. 
42 NIHONKOKUKENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], ch. IV, art. 41 (Japan). 
43 Id. ch. III, art. 14. 
441d. ch. III (Rights and Duties of the People). 
4s Id. ch. IV (The Diet), ch. V (The Cabinet) and ch. VI (Judiciary). 
46] d. ch. II, art. 9 (Renunciation of War). 
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The new constitution represented a radical departure from the 
political and social conventions that had existed in the country for 
centuries. Significant attention has been focused on the reduction of the 
role of the Emperor from "sacred and inviolable" to "symbol of the 
State" in Article 1, and the renunciation of war and permanent 
disarmament clauses of Article 9. 47 Often overlooked is how 
completely the document uprooted such foundational elements of 
Japanese society as centralized control over local government, 
restrictions on labor rights, constraints on gender equality, control over 
education and perpetuation of the family structure.4s Filial piety and the 
family unit, together with the imperial line embodied by the Emperor, 
has long constituted the heart of the national identity of the people.49 
The haste of adoption and the ad-hoc nature of the drafting 
process created additional issues. On a practical level, critics cite flaws 
such as inconsistencies between, and poor drafting of, the English and 
Japanese versions, and conflicting, duplicative and inconsistent terms 
within the English version.so 
It did not take long for political lines to be drawn in the debates 
around the document. For the conservative political elite, it was an 
alien-authored imposition of universalist principles incompatible with 
Japanese social customs and values. s1 There is reasonable basis to 
conclude they only acquiesced to its adoption because it was the least 
47 HERBERT Brx, HIROHITO AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 575-78, 569, 571 
(2001). 
48 Borton, Democracy in Japan, supra note 38, at 412-15. 
49 CAROL GLUCK, JAPAN'S MODERN MYTHS 133 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985) (in describing the role of the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 in 
forging national unity through the establishment of a new "civil morality": "'Japan's 
indigenous morality' began with filiality and the family and then extended to the 
nation in the form of loyalty and patriotism"); KENNETH J. RUOFF, THE PEOPLE'S 
EMPEROR 18 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001) ("the intellectual 
foundations of modem nationalism centering on the throne can be traced to the 
seventeenth century ... during the three centuries of Tokugawa rule ... nativist ... 
scholars defined the throne as the distinctive feature of Japanese identity"). 
50 DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT, supra note 16, at 386; Ward, Origins, supra note 14, 
at 1006-07 (noting the "umnistakable alien and American quality of the language in 
both" and that "the style is simply not good Japanese"). 
51 Ward, Origins, supra note 14, at 1001 ("an almost ideally democratic constitution, 
... [i]t had even less relevance to the traditional and dominant political aspirations and 
practices of Japan"); Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 403 ("[t]here is 
small doubt ... that the document as a whole was distinctly unpalatable to a large 
number of the members (including both prime ministers) of the Shidehara and Yoshida 
cabinets, the two governments that presided over and were ostensibly responsible for 
its drafting and enactment"). 
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objectionable alternative open to Japan at the time.52 Many observers 
assumed it was only a matter of time before it would be amended. 53 
For the liberals and intellectuals who had been persecuted and 
sidelined during the pre-war years, the constitution enshrined the 
democratic values they aspired for the country to adopt.54 Reflecting 
strong leftist sentiments that had been unleashed in Japan-mirroring 
similar movements across Asia-they had no interest in seeing the 
governance of the country revert to unchecked right-wing control.55 As 
later years show, they were determined to ensure its principles remained 
intact and untouched. 56 
A number of the document's prov1s1ons soon raised 
uncomfortable issues for the U.S. The outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950-scarcely three years after its enactment-highlighted the 
negative consequences of imposing permanent disarmament on Japan 
in light of its strategic importance.57 Even in the lead-up to the conflict, 
the U.S. had already started to retreat from the liberal democratic 
principles it had insisted upon through strict controls over free labor 
movements and censorship of leftist and anti-Occupation media, all in 
52 Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 403. 
53 DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT, supra note 16, at 400; Ward, Constitution 
Commission, supra note 6, at 402. 
54 DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT, supra note 16, at 387. See also, id. at 356-58 
(describing an early private draft produced by Kempa Kenkyukai (Constitutional 
Research Association), composed of liberal and left-wing intellectuals, which was 
deemed by GHQ as "democratic and acceptable" and praised for its "outstanding 
liberal provisions", making it influential in GHQ's own draft). Hajime Yamamoto, 
Interpretation of the Pacifist Article of the Constitution by the Bureau of Cabinet 
Legislation: A New Source of Constitutional Law?, 26 PAC. RIML. &PoL'Y 99, 102 
(2017) [hereinafter, "Yamamoto, Constitutional Interpretation"]. 
55 See DOWER,EMBRACINGDEFEAT, supra note 16, at233-39, 249-50 (noting the role 
of atonement and repentance on the part of intellectuals and academics, who had 
largely acquiesced to the state during the war, as powerful motivating forces for their 
embrace of leftist idealism after defeat). 
56 See PYLE, AMERICAN CENTURY, supra note 8, at 182-87 (on the roots of Japan's 
postwar progressive politics). 
57 PYLE, AMERICAN CENTURY, supra note 8, at 161-62 (describing how American-
imposed mandates of renunciation of war, peace education and the enfranchisement 
of women (who were overwhelmingly against re-armament), together with the rise of 
left-wing sentiment and fears of reawakening militarism, all constrained Japan's 
ability to acquiesce to U.S. demands for Japan to re-militarize). The communist 
victory in China in 1949, the outbreak of the Korean War and the emergence of the 
Cold War forced U.S. policymakers to ensure Japan played a central role in the 
regional balance of power. The ability of Japan to defend itself was deemed necessary 
to ensure its ability to remain independent and prevent its gravitation into the Soviet 
orbit. Id. at 150-53. 
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reaction to the rising communist threat in the region and significant 
domestic unrest.ss These changing circumstances highlighted some of 
the many contradictions and tensions created by the document that 
required some form of adaptive response. 
THE PROCESS OF ADAPTATION 
On the domestic front, the process of adapting the democratic 
principles of the constitution to the conservative social and political 
conventions of the country was a laborious and complex undertaking 
that started almost immediately after promulgation.No fewer than forty-
five laws were passed to enact its provisions and replace or overhaul 
existing laws that had become invalid. 59 
The views of opposing political parties, including conservatives, 
socialists, and communists, had to be negotiated and reconciled.60 The 
FEC, having been excluded from the initial drafting process,61 pressed 
SCAP for its views to be incorporated.62 Negotiations between GHQ 
and the Japanese government worked to resolve these as well as other 
comments and requests for changes from the Japanese side. Differences 
58 DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT, supra note 16, at 405-40. Initially intent on the 
complete political and social liberalization of the country, the U.S. was forced to 
reverse course on a number of reform initiatives. The Japanese left, originally 
supporters of the U.S. agenda, grew increasingly disenchanted with U.S. policy. In 
matters of security the U.S., initially having supported the complete disarmament of 
the country, was actively urging rearmament and increased burden-sharing for its 
defense. The Japanese right, which should have welcomed the change, was now 
caught in the middle of new U.S. demands, its own desire to place higher priority on 
urgent economic stability and recovery, and continuing disarmament pressure from 
the non-U.S. Allied Powers. Akira Iriye, Japan Returns to the World, in GoRDON A. 
CRAIG&FRANCISL. LOEWENHEIMEDS., THE DIPLOMATS 1939-1979, 328 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994). 
59 McNelly, Constitutional Reform, supra note 11, at 98 (citing POLITICAL 
REORIENTATION, supra note 26). Other accounts place the number at eighty new laws. 
D. CLAYTON JAMES, THE YEARS OF MACARTHUR: TRIUMPH AND DISASTER 1945-
1964, 140 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985). 
60 Inoue, Japan Constitution, supra note 5, at 31-36 (noting the debates in the Imperial 
Diet lasted for 114 days, with the govermnent responding "well over" one thousand 
times to questions from more than 104 interpellators, generating more than thirty-five 
hundred pages of transcripts). 
61 See supra text at notes 28-29. 
62 Ward, Origins, supra note 14, at 1006; McNelly, Constitutional Reform, supra note 
11, at 96-98. 
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of nuance, meaning, and interpretation had to be reconciled between the 
English and Japanese draftS.63 
During the entire process, the U.S. views being imposed had to 
be balanced with ensuring the document reflected the "freely expressed 
will of the Japanese people," 64 an express condition of the Potsdam 
Declaration.6s The process of negotiating the constitutional text and the 
concurrent implementing legislation involved an active ongoing debate 
among all the political parties represented in the Imperial Diet. 66 This 
supported GHQ's interest in ensuring its reforms were adopted in a 
manner that would promote their longevity after the Allied Occupation 
ended.67 
The constitutional debate in the Imperial Diet was also 
consistent with the willingness of at least some at GHQ to accommodate 
conservative desires to retain vestiges of the old pre-war system, 
provided basic principles were not threatened. 68 Thus, while the 
constitutional text generally retained its original wording, 69 the 
implementing legislation was passed (where acceptable) in conformity 
with more familiar Japanese customs and practices. 70 
63 Ward, Origins, supra note 14, at 1001-06; Inoue, Japan Constitution, supra note 5, 
at 33. 
64 Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan, Nov. 3, 1945, para. 3.a (in 2 
POLITICAL REORIENTATION, supra note 26, at 429) ("it is not the responsibility of the 
occupation forces to impose on Japan any form of govermnent not supported by the 
freely expressed will of the people"). See also Tanaka, Legal Traditions, supra note 2, 
at 113 ("knowledge that [the reforms] had been imposed by the Allies would 
materially reduce the possibility of their acceptance and support by the Japanese 
people for the future.") (quoting State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee policy 
directive SWNCC-228). 
65 Potsdam Declaration, supra note 22, para. 12. 
66 See supra text at note 60. 
67 Kurt Steiner, The Occupation and the Reform of the Japanese Civil Code, 
[hereinafter, "Steiner, Civil Code Reform"] in DEMOCRATIZING JAPAN, supra note 2, 
at 211. Ironically, SCAP itself was compelled to bow to political exigencies by rolling 
back reform through its "reverse course" in 1946. See supra note 58 and accompanying 
text. 
68 See, e.g., Steiner, Civil Code Reform, supra note 67, at 203-05 (describing the 
debates between conservatives, progressives and communists about the degree to 
which the pre-war family system should be reformed or retained). 
68 Inoue, Japan Constitution, supra note 5, at 33 ("the Americans insist[ed] that the 
respective meanings of the English and Japanese expressions had to be very close, if 
not the same"). 
69 ld. 
10 See, e.g., Hideki Mori, Workers' Rights in Japanese Labor Praxis, in FIVE DECADES 
OF CONSTITUTIONALISMIN JAPANESE SOCIETY 171-293 (Yoichi Higuchi ed., 2001) 
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In certain areas where legislative acts implemented SCAP 
reforms in a manner consistent with the constitutional text, the process 
of adaptation took the form of post-Occupation legislation which 
revised or superseded Occupation-era laws.n Such actions were taken 
with respect to various laws, including those regulating public 
education n and local governmental autonomy. 73 
In areas where reforms embodied in the constitutional text were 
not implemented through legislation, such provisions were left open to 
administrative interpretation. In certain cases, bureaucratic 
implementation altered the original intent of a number of important 
provisions. These include the rights of academic freedom under Article 
2374 and most notably, the disarmament clause of Article 9. 75 Thus, 
while continuing to preserve the original wording, the substantive 
meaning of certain provisions were reinterpreted to conform to more 
desirable Japanese customs and practices or to respond to changing 
international circumstances. 
These adaptive processes have been granted relative freedom to 
operate as a result of judicial deference to bureaucratic actions and the 
(setting forth an overview of the relatively restrictive body of law that co-exists with 
constitutional provisions unconditionally guaranteeing fundamental labor rights 
including the right to strike). 
11 See infra notes 72-73. 
n See, e.g., Law on the Organization and Management of Local Education 
Administration (1956) (which replaced the School Board Law (1948)) (replacing 
popular election of members of the boards of education with an appointment system, 
and placing them under the control of prefectural boards which need approval of the 
Ministry of Education on important policy matters); see also Masayuki Uchino, The 
Struggle for Educational Freedom, in FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
JAPANESE SOCIETY 118 (Yoichi Higuchi ed., 2001). 
73 See Yoshiaki Yoshida,AuthoriDJ of the National and Local Governments Under the 
Constitution, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 111 (Percy R. Luney Jr. & 
Kazuyoshi Takahashi eds., 1993) (citing revisions to the Police Law in 1954 and the 
enactment of the Organization and Management of Local Education Administration in 
1956 as examples of national govermnent increases of power over local govermnent, 
and citing local finance and employment as other areas of central control, attributing 
the increase in this tendency to the rapid economic growth of the 1960s and subsequent 
expansion of executive powers in Tokyo). 
74 See Don Adams & Mamom Oshiba, Japanese Education: After the Americans Left, 
39 PEABODY J. OF EDUC. 9, 111 (1961) (during the Occupation, "[a]lthough the 
Ministry of Education continued to set certain minimum standards, textbooks were 
permitted to be published by private publishers and selected for use by local school 
boards", after the Occupation the Ministry of Education "more closely supervise[ s] the 
content of textbooks ... and make[s] alterations consistent with the policies of the 
Ministry."). 
1s See infra text at notes 156-92. 
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reluctance of the Supreme Court to exercise its power of judicial review 
over the constitutionality of administrative action or Diet legislation. 76 
Accordingly, the current constitution functions somewhat as a "hybrid" 
instrumentn which has come to be implemented and interpreted-and 
to function-quite differently from its plain meaning in a number of 
areas.7s This has led to substantial and spirited debate about whether the 
process of legislative action and bureaucratic interpretation has crossed 
the line of amending the constitution, in violation of the formal 
amendment process mandated by Article 96. 79 It also has given weight 
to arguments for the need for formal amendments.so 
76 See infra text at notes 132-39; see also David S. Law, Why Has Judicial Review 
Failed in Japan?, 68 WASH. U. L. REV. 1425, 1447 (2011) [hereinafter, "Law, Judicial 
Review"] (" ... it is clear that the [Supreme Court] exercises a large measure of self-
restraint in the area of judicial review, and especially so where politically sensitive 
issues are involved."). In areas where the Supreme Court has been willing to exercise 
such review and has found constitutional violations, it has been hampered by its lack 
of contempt powers and its circumspection about exercising continuing jurisdiction 
over parties that would ensure compliance with its rulings. Id. at 1452; see also John 
0. Haley, Constitutional Adjudication in Japan: Context, Structures and Values, 88 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1467, 1484-85 (2011). 
77 Yamamoto, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 54, at 119 (with respect to 
interpretative adaptation: "because interpretation has an effect similar to that of 
constitutional amendment, but is not constitutional without an amendment, it is a 
'semi-constitutional' norm or 'quasi-constitutional' norm contra legem ... such a way 
of thinking on the 'semi-constitutional' norm is particular to Japanese 
constitutionalism"). 
78 See Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 402 ("[t]he Japanese 
Govermnent has by administrative means and by legal and judicial inteipretations 
subverted or substantially altered the original intent of several important provisions of 
the ... constitution and the prime laws associated with it .... "); see also Law, Judicial 
Review, supra note 76, at 1431 (quoting a "Current or Former Member of the Supreme 
Court of Japan": "the Japanese 'do believe in the power of words, but not in the literal 
meaning of words expressed"'). 
79 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon & Guy Baldwin, Globalizing Constitutional Moments? A 
Reflection on the Japanese Article 9 Debate, 67 AM. J. COMP. L. 145, 176 (2019); 
Martin, Informal Amendment, supra note 25, at 467-68 (arguing that a 2013 
reinterpretation of Article 9 amounted to a de facto amendment inconsistent with past 
interpretations); Hamano, Constitution and Human Rights, supra note 38, at 417 ("the 
Constitution often may have been radically and undemocratically amended despite its 
apparently pristine text"); Yamamoto, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 54, at 
114-15. But see McElwain, supra note 4, at 2-4 (arguing that the brevity of Japan's 
constitution reduces the necessity for amendments, noting for example that 
constitutional vagueness on the architecture of govermnent has permitted electoral 
laws to determine matters normally requiring constitutional amendment in other 
countries to be determined by simple legislative majority). See also infra note 102. 
80 Yamamoto, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 54, at 118 ("the current 
majority of Japanese constitutional scholars now affirm emphatically that [changes 
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ROOTS OF THE AMENDMENT DEBATE 
As the conservative party in power during the entire post-war 
era, except for two brief periods, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
has been able to implement the foregoing changes in interpretation of 
the constitution largely, although not completely, in conformity with its 
policy views.81 It is perhaps not surprising that a number of deviations 
echo the early attempts during the original negotiations with SCAP' s 
Government Section to preserve certain aspects of pre-war political and 
social institutions and practices, to the concern of opposition parties and 
other anti-revisionists. 82 Having lost many of their arguments with 
SCAP during the negotiation process, conservative politicians began 
openly advocating for constitutional change in the early years after 
adoption and as the end of the Allied Occupation approached. 83 
Against this backdrop a number of arguments have been 
advanced for and against formal amendments. Conservative proponents 
argue they would simply make the constitution consistent with the way 
it is already interpreted and implemented. 84 They view reform as an 
opportunity to finally settle "theological" debates8s that have existed 
since inception-particularly those surrounding the constitutionality of 
the Self Defense Forces (the "SDF").86 Proposed amendments to Article 
such as the 2014 reinteipretation of Article 9 (see infra text at notes 184-92)] cannot 
be implemented without recourse to the procedures for constitutional amendment 
stipulated by Article 96"). 
81 See, e.g., infra text at notes 131, 155. But see infra text at notes 123-24. 
82 Yamamoto, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 54, at 102 
83 Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 403-04. 
84 Motoko Rich, Shinzo Abe Announces Plan to Revise Japan's Pacifist Constitution, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2017, at A7. There also are elements of the revisionist camp that 
believe the origins of the document, having been imposed on the country after defeat, 
taint its legitimacy and do not reflect the true aspirations of the Japanese people. Sheila 
A. Smith, Abe's Win and Japan's Constitutional Debate, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, (Oct. 27, 2017), https://.www.cfr.org/expert-brief/abes-win-and-japans-
constitutional-debate [hereinafter, "Smith, Constitutional Debate"]. 
85 Library of Congress Report, infra note 127, at 20. See also Hideshi Tokuchi, Former 
Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, Japan Ministry of Defense, 
Implications of Revision of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan on the Defense 
Policy of Japan, Address at the Columbia Law School Conference on Constitutional 
Reform (Mar. 13, 2019) [hereinafter, "Tokuchi"] (arguing that legal and "theological" 
arguments impede the development of a common policy community necessary to 
establish a consensus on national defense; without a "common language and logic on 
defense matters ... the focus of the policy discussion will continue to be on the tactical 
question of how to slip past the constitutional restrictions"). 
86 The main arguments of the revisionists are to make explicit the status of the SDF by 
formalizing its legality, while leaving the substance of its self-defense focus 
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9 would finally clarify the textual contradiction of its disarmament 
provision with the existence of one of the largest and most 
technologically advanced military forces in the world.87 
Observers not necessarily driven by political motives cite 
obvious gaps in the document that need to be addressed. One example 
is the absence of express authority of the Prime Minister to dissolve the 
Diet (although exercised by the Prime Minister in practice, such power 
is expressly reserved to the Emperor). 88 Other issues such as the 
emergency powers of the Cabinet during national crises (the absence of 
which was first felt during the 1995 Kobe earthquake and again during 
the 2011 Fukushima earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis), and 
abdication of the Emperor (an issue that arose in 2018), are not expressly 
addressed.89 There clearly is room to address electoral reform-an area 
in which the Japanese Supreme Court has found constitutional 
violations, yet has not prescribed remedies. 90 As for practical 
considerations in the military realm, there is no system of military 
justice or courts martial,91 the status of SDF personnel is equivalent to 
that of civil servants (subjecting them to the full range of domestic laws, 
including criminal laws, during deployment), n and there is no 
unchanged. Tomohiro Osaki, Campaign Kicks Ojjfor Japan Upper House Poll, a 
Litmus Test for Constitutional Reform and Tax Hike, JAPAN TIMES (July 4, 2019), 
https ://www .japantimes.co .jp/news/2019/07 /04/national/politics-diplomacy /campaig 
ning-kicks-off-japans-july-21-upper-house-election. 
87 According to Global Firepower's 2019 Military Strength Ranking, Japan ranks sixth 
among nations according to a power index that takes into account a number of factors 
including weapons and naval asset diversity, nuclear capability, and financial stability. 
2019 Military Strength Ranking, GLOBALFIREPOWER.COM, https://www.globalfirepo 
wer.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2019). 
88 McNelly, Constitutional Reform, supra note 11, at 98-99; NIHONKOKU KENPO 
[KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 7, item 3 (Japan); see also Inoue, Japan Constitution, 
supra note 5, at 10 ("the govermnent has effectively rationalized dissolving the Lower 
House in [cases other than no-confidence resolutions] by stretching the inteipretation 
of Article 7, Item 3 .... "). 
89 Carl F. Goodman, Contemplated Amendments to Japan's 1947 Constitution: A 
Return to lye, Kokutai and the Meiji State, 26 WASH. INT'L L.J. 17, 26 n.43 
[hereinafter, "Goodman, Contemplated Amendments"]. 
90 Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Commission, 30 Minshu 3, 223 (Sup. Ct. 
Grand Bench Judgment of Apr. 14, 1976); Kanao v. Hiroshima Prefecture Election 
Commission, 39 Minshu 5, 1100 (Grand Bench Judgment ofJuly 17, 1985). See also 
Law, Judicial Review, supra note 76, at 1427 n.8 (noting that in response to the failure 
of the Diet for decades to comply with the Supreme Court's rulings, "the Court has 
reiterated in a string of cases that the apportionment scheme remains unconstitutional, 
but it has consistently declined to order a remedy."). See infra note 131. 
91 JONES & RA VITCH, supra note 3 5, at 99. 
nld. at 191-92. 
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constitutional prov1s10n mandating subordination of the military to 
civilian control.93 
But perhaps the most basic and strongly held argument of the 
revisionists is based on concepts of legitimacy, sovereignty, and 
national self-determination.94 As a prominent scholar noted, this faction 
believes Japan has successfully cast off its historical impediments to 
democracy and has "a right and duty to decide for [itself] what form of 
basic political rights and institutions [it] desire[s], and to embody these 
decisions in a constitution and language of [its] own choosing ... based 
upon [its] history, traditions, and national sentiments."9s 
In contrast, anti-revisionists have a deep distrust of conservative 
intentions, rooted in historical memory. For them, the constitution 
embodies principles that have been core to the post-war identity of the 
nation, and expresses the lessons of a disastrous, misdirected pre-war 
political system, serving as a formal check on future abuses.96 To the 
extent the conservative majority has been able to control the political 
responses to the document's perceived shortcomings through executive 
and legislative action, the anti-revisionists would prefer to continue to 
engage in reform through such political processes rather than through 
formal constitutional change.97 
In the background, Japan's Asian neighbors express concern 
about Japanese intentions and harbor simmering resentments over 
Japan's "lack of atonement" for the war.9s Concurrently, the evolving 
93 Tokuchi, supra note 85, at 5-6. See also Richard J. Samuels, Politics, Security 
Policy, and Japan's Cabinet Legislation Bureau 27-28 (JPRI, Working Paper No. 99, 
2004) [hereinafter, "Samuels, Legislation Bureau"] (noting arguments that Japan has 
had "bureaucratic control" over the military in contrast to "civilian control", further 
noting that a full understanding of civil-military relations is difficult due to lack of 
information about the balance of power between bureaucrats and politicians). 
94 See McElwain, supra note 4, at 1 (noting conservative criticism that the document 
"unnecessarily constrain[s] the "normal" foreign and security policy autonomy of the 
nation, ... elevat[es] individual rights above civic duties, and more generally ... [is] 
too antiquated to deal with emerging domestic and international problems"). See also 
Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 409 (citing a March 1964 
memorandum signed by 29 members of the Constitution Commission stating that "we 
cannot recognize that the present constitution of Japan was established by the free will 
of the people ofJapan ... ".). 
95 Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 409. 
96 A principal focus of the anti-revision camp is fully preserving the explicit 
commitment to peace and the foundations of Japan's postwar democracy as 
represented by restructured political power and subordination of the military set forth 
in the constitution. Smith, Constitutional Debate, supra note 84. 
97 Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 408. See infra text at note 111. 
98 RICHARD MCGREGOR, ASIA'S RECKONING 144-211 (2017). 
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global security landscape since the early 1990s has forced Japan to begin 
the process of adapting its defense policies to changing international 
circumstanceS.99 These competing interests have potential regional and 
global implications for Japan's decisions regarding constitutional 
change, particularly with respect to the disarmament clause of Article 
9.100 
On a broader level, scholarly critics have noted that although the 
lack of amendments can be interpreted as a sign of stability and public 
acceptance of the constitution, 101 it also could be interpreted as a sign of 
"decay," with undue executive and majority legislative power rendering 
the process of interpretation vulnerable to entrenched political over 
independent judicial judgments.102 
The arguments for and against reform therefore may be viewed 
as expressions of tension between a desire for political and social self-
determination on the one hand, and acceptance of externally imposed 
universalist values (albeit adapted over time) on the other. At the same 
time, they also could be viewed as a struggle between the revival of 
familiar Japanese forms of political governance (historically pre-war 
albeit with significant changes) and a desire for a clean break with the 
past. 
OBSTACLES TO REFORM 
In light of these debates and the movement toward reform, it is 
instructive to examine the earliest formal reform effort that was 
undertaken shortly after the end of the Allied Occupation, when it first 
became politically possible to consider such a move. Many of the issues 
examined during that process continue to resonate today .103 
99 PYLE, AMERICAN CENTURY, supra note 8, at 356-60. 
100 J. PATRICK BOYD & RICHARD SAMUELS, NINE LIVES?: THE POLITICS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN JAPAN 62-63 (2005) [hereinafter, "BOYD & SAMUELS"]; 
Smith, Constitutional Debate, supra note 84 ("any attempt to revamp the status quo 
with regard to Article 9 will be viewed as opening the door to an expansionist Japan"). 
101 Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 402; Hamano, Constitution and 
Human Rights, supra note 38, at 417. 
102 Hamano, Constitution and Human Rights, supra note 38 at 417. See also Inoue, 
Japan Constitution, supra note 5, at 11 (arguing that the paucity of specific political 
governance provisions in the constitution, together with the stringent requirements for 
amendment, provide room for lawmakers to implement policies outside the 
constitution without any practical need for revision, but that such practices undermine 
the "power-limiting doctrines of constitutionalism"). 
103 See Quigley, Revising the Constitution, supra note 18, at 143 (noting the resistance 
in the immediate post-war period of the Socialist Party, "which has tended to view 
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In 1956, the Diet passed a law establishing the Commission on 
the Constitution, which was charged with a broad investigation of the 
post-war constitution. 104 The law provided for a maximum of fifty 
members appointed directly by the Cabinet-thirty from the Diet and 
twenty from the ranks of "persons of learning and experience."10s It 
started work in 1957 and issued its final report in 1964.106 
From the beginning, the commission's work was the focal point 
of the struggle between the revisionist and anti-revisionist camps in 
Japan.107 The socialists, who represented almost all the non-communist 
left at the time, boycotted the commission. 10s The remaining anti-
revisionists ( consisting of scholars and others "learned" in constitutional 
revisionism as a disguise for return of the old regime" echoing current anti-revisionist 
arguments). On January 20, 2000, the Lower House and Upper House formed research 
commissions to conduct a similarly broad and comprehensive study of the constitution. 
This constituted the second effort to reconsider the constitution. Similar to the first 
effort, no recommendations were made but they did attempt to provide a basis for 
future discussion. See Constitutional Change in Japan - The Politics of Revision - The 
Mechanics of Revision, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, https://www.cfr.org/interac 
tive/japan-constitution/politics-of-revision (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). They issued 
their reports on April 15, 2005, and April 20, 2005, respectively. Final Report, 
Research Commission on the Constitution, The House of Representatives, (Apr. 
2005), http.JLwww shugiin go jp/i ntemet/itdb _ kenprni nsf/hlml/kenpou/chosa/en/repo 
rt.pdf/$File/report.pdf; Handbook on the Research Report on the Constitution of 
Japan, Research Commission on the Constitution, House of Councillors, Japan (2005), 
http://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/report/ehb/ehb.pdf. 
104 McNelly, Constitutional Reform, supra note 11, at 99. 
10s Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 405. 
106 Id. at 404. The text of the final report at almost 900 pages, together with 
supplementary volumes, was voluminous, covering thousands of pages. Ward, 
Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 404 n.5. A translation and edited version of 
the final report is available in English in JOHN A. MAKI, JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT (1980) [hereinafter, "MAKI, FINAL REPORT"]. 
101 Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 405-11. 
10s The socialists asserted that (i) it was unconstitutional for the Cabinet to set up under 
its own jurisdiction a commission charged with investigating a possible amendment, 
arguing that Article 96 of the constitution reserves this power to the Diet, and (ii) 
because the conservative majority had already decided to recommend constitutional 
revision, it did not want to lend legitimacy to the process. McNelly, Constitutional 
Reform, supra note 11, at 99; Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 405. 
Similar sentiments color the current debates on constitutional revision. See McElwain, 
supra note 4, at 9 ("[c]urrently, opposition parties are refusing to even participate in 
Diet deliberations of constitutional amendment, over concerns that their participation 
will only legitimize the LDP's proposals without any effect on their eventual 
content"). Ultimately, during the seven years of its existence, the commission 
maintained a total of 38 or 39 members, 19 of which were "persons of learning and 
experience". Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 405-06. 
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law, all of whom were substantially outnumbered) were able to extract 
concessions from the rev1s10nist majority to avoid issuing 
recommendations by vote, which almost certainly would have resulted 
in amendment recommendations. 109 Instead, the comm1ss10n 
maximized the factual and scholarly content of its report and, rather than 
presenting a majority view, compromised by presenting the individual 
viewpoints of all the committee members without conclusions or 
recommendations.110 
Several results of the final report foreshadowed the current state 
of the amendment debate. Most, if not all, of the anti-revisionists 
believed in gradual change and adaptation of the document through 
judicial interpretation and administrative implementation, without 
formal amendment. m In contrast, the revisionist faction all agreed that 
while there may be room for interpretation and application, it is 
impossible to resolve the shortcomings of the document by those means 
alone, and that revision is necessary because their utilization has already 
gone beyond their limits.112 
The commissioners considered a number of fundamental 
questions. Among them were whether the constitution must conform to 
the "universal principles of mankind" and to the "history, tradition, 
individuality and national character of Japan."m They also considered 
whether the document must be "realistic and practical and in conformity 
with world trends."114 
109 Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 406-07. 
110 Id. See also MAKI, FINAL REPORT, supra note 106, at 6-7 (quoting the Chairman 
of the Conunission, Professor Kenzo Takayanagi: (i) that in light of the boycott of the 
Socialist Party, "it would have been nonsensical to adopt the usual majority rule and 
thereafter declare that the majority was in favor of constitutional revision"; (ii) that the 
Conunission did not consider itself to be a policymaking body and therefore the quality 
of the opinions furnished to policymakers was more important than numerical 
strength; and (iii) suggesting that the Commission held hopes for future participation 
of the Socialist Party, which could be foreclosed by the issuance of a majority report). 
m Ward, Constitution Commission, supra note 6, at 408; MAKI, FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 106, at 235-38. The anti-revisionist camp represented the liberal end of the 
political spectrum who were the strongest proponents for maintaining the original 
language of the constitution. 
112 MAKI, FINAL REPORT, supra note 106, at 232. The revisionist camp represented the 
conservative end of the political spectrum which characterized the instrument as "alien 
in authorship and idiom, destructive of the traditional status of the dynasty, disruptive 
of the family system and restrictive of military power." Quigley, Revising the 
Constitution, supra note 18, at 144. 
113 MAKI,FINALREPORT, supra note 106, at213-16. 
114 Id. at 216-20. 
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Both rev1s10nist and anti-rev1s10nist factions agreed that the 
constitution should be one that is freely enacted by the Japanese people 
in conformity with such principles. rn The difference of opinion 
regarding whether revisions would be required for the document to 
fulfill its objectives arose from different views regarding whether it was 
freely enacted by the Japanese people, 116 the extent to which its 
universalist principles infringed on the history and traditions of Japan, 117 
and whether the three principles of pacifism, democracy, and human 
rights were too conceptual in light of world trends. us 
Similarly, the commission unanimously agreed that the ideal of 
pacifism should be supported, and all the commissioners agreed on the 
right of individual and collective self-defense.119 However, they were 
split on the issue of whether revision was required, with the revisionists 
in the majority .120 The basic outlines of these divisions have continued 
largely along these lines to the present day.121 
Then as now, domestic politics have been the principal reason 
for the failure of constitutional reform.122 Opponents of revision have 
been continuously in the political minority during the post-war era, 
except for two brief periods in 1994-1995 (when the Socialists headed 
a coalition government with the LDP) and 2009-2012 (when the 
Democratic Party of Japan was able to achieve a majority of the House 
of Representatives (Lower House)). However, until recently the LDP 
has not been able to command the requisite two-thirds supermajority of 
both houses for amendment proposals to pass.123 When they have, either 
m Id. at 218-19. 
116 ld. at 219. See also supra text at notes 11-36, 62. 
m MAKI, FINAL REPORT, supra note 106, at 219. See also supra text at notes 37-49. 
11s MAKI, FINAL REPORT, supra note 106, at 219. See also supra text at note 41. 
119 MAKI, FINAL REPORT, supra note 106, at 271. 
120Id. at271-72. 
121 See supra text at notes 84-97. 
122 See BOYD & SAMUELS, supra note 100, at viii (citing a conseIVative-liberal 
coalition of pragmatists and pacifists up to the 1990s for the longevity of Article 9 
without amendment). See also Kenneth Mori McElwain's and Daniel M. Smith's 
studies of how voters' sentiments on reform can be affected by the identity of the party 
proposing the change, as well as the specific content of the proposed change. 
McElwain, supra note 4, and infra note 123. 
123 From 2012, the LDP has led Japan's governing coalition with partner Komeito and 
has commanded a two-thirds majority in the Lower House since 2014. Memorandum 
by Daniel M. Smith, Prepared for the Columbia Law School Conference on 
Constitutional Reform in Japan on March 13, 2019 (Mar. 2, 2019) (on file with the 
author). This gave the LDP coalition sufficient power to override the House of 
Councillors (Upper House), but not the requisite bi-cameral supermajority to pass 
constitutional amendment proposals. Since 2016, the LDP, togetherwithKomeito and 
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alone or as part of a coalition, they have failed internally or with their 
coalition partners to agree on the content and timing of changes.124 
In addition to the legislative hurdles, revision requires a majority 
of all votes cast in a public referendum. 12s The constitution has 
continued to retain popular support, in particular the renunciation of war 
clause contained in Article 9 .126 Although sentiment has been shifting, 
the public mood for many years generally had not been receptive to 
change.127 The post-war period up to the 1990s was largely a period of 
other parties favoring constitutional revision, has held a two-thirds majority of pro-
revision members of the Upper House. McElwain, supra note 4, at 1. This 
supermajority in the Upper House was lost during elections held on July 20, 2019. 
Motoko Rich, Shinzo Abe Declares Victory in Japan Election but Without Mandate to 
Revise Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2019, at A4. 
124 Rieko Miko, Abe taps Brakes on Constitution Reform as Support Flags, NIKKEI 
ASIAN REV. (Oct. 6, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Abe-taps-brakes-on-
constitution-reform-as-support-flags; Martin, Informal Amendment, supra note 25, at 
465 (lack of amendment "is due to a complex set of political dynamics both among 
the factions of the [LDP] ... and among the LDP and the various opposition parties."). 
125 NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96 (Japan); NIHONKOKU KENP 
0 NO KAISEI TETUDUKI NI KANSURU HORITSU [Law Concerning Procedures for 
Amendment of the Constitution of Japan], Law No. 51, 2007 ("Amendment 
Procedures Law"), art. 98, clause 2 (Japan). 
126 Polling data in Japan on the question of constitutional change is notably mixed, 
with varying results depending on the framing, scope and content of the questions, 
which differ by poll-takers. In one 2017 poll, 89% of respondents replied that they 
believe the constitution has played a positive role in society since its implementation 
in 1947. See McElwain, supra note 4, at 4 (citing the annual surveys of Yomiuri 
Shimbun, Japan's largest daily newspaper). Taking polling data from Kyodo News 
Service for the past three years as a baseline, responses to whether Article 9 should be 
revised have been split within a narrow band: 49% in favor, 47% opposed in 2017; 
44% in favor, 46%opposed in2018; and 45% in favor and 47% opposed in 2019. The 
Constitution Turns 70, JAPAN TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opi 
nion/2017 /05/03/editorials/constitution-tums-70/#.XZe4VG5FymQ; Majority of 
Japanese Oppose Any Constitutional Revisions Under Abe, But See Need for Future 
Changes, Poll Finds, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.japanesetimes.co.jp/ 
news/2018/04/26/national/majority-favor-constitutional-revision-just-not -abe-poll/#. 
XZe4cW5FymQ; Poll Shows 54% Oppose Revisions of Japan's Pacifist Constitution 
Under Abe's Watch, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.j[/new 
s/2019 /04/ 11/national/politics-diplomacy /poll-shows-54-oppose-revision-j apans-paci 
fist-constitution/#.XZe4jm5FymQ. 
121 The Law Library of Congress, Global Research Center, Japan: Interpretations of 
Article 9 of the Constitution, at 43 (Sept. 2015), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-
constitution/interpretations-article9 .php#-ftnref98 [hereinafter, "Library of Congress 
Report'] ( citing polls indicating a clear majority of Japanese not favoring amendment, 
with no such proposals from the late 1950s to the 1980s, and citing separate polls 
indicating that since 1993, more people have favored amendment than opposed it). In 
the same Kyodo News Service polls cited above, responses to the more general 
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public complacency, with a relatively strong sense of security and 
absorption with domestic issues and economic development.12s It was 
not until 2007 that the LDP was able to pass legislation to establish the 
procedures by which a public referendum could be held.129 
Contributing to the perceived lack of pressing need for formal 
amendment, the Supreme Court has deferred to the executive and 
legislative branches on "political" questions.Bo As a result, a number 
of political initiatives implicating constitutional questions that 
otherwise may be subject to challenge or judicial review have been 
implemented without need for amendment through legislative action 
and executive branch interpretations. Relative political stability over 
many decades in the form of LDP rule, aided by the entrenching effect 
of electoral malapportionment, has facilitated the process of 
interpretative and legislative adaptation. m 
question of whether amending the constitution is "necessary" or "may be necessary" 
were distinctly clearer: 60% in favor, 37% opposed in 2017; 58% in favor, 39% 
opposed in 2018; and 63% in favor, 36% opposed in 2019. See supra note 126 and 
accompanying text. In a 2018 Y omiuri Shimbun survey, the percentages were 51 % in 
favor, 46% opposed. McElwain, supra note 4, at 4. 
12s Library of Congress Report, supra note 127, at 23. 
129 During the inteIVening period a number of events caused Japan to begin the process 
of re-evaluating its international commitments and national security priorities, starting 
with the Gulf War in 1990 through the War on Terror after 9/11 and its aftermath. 
These events, coupled with strong U.S. pressure, required a re-examination of and 
renewed debate over the constitutional constraints on Japan's military capabilities. 
The final trigger for the political shift which led to passage of the Amendment 
Procedures Law was the Koizumi Cabinet's deployment of SDF forces overseas in the 
2004. 2 0SAMU WATANABE ED., KENPO KAISEI MONDA! SHIRYO [MATERIALS ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION QUESTION] 429 (Tokyo: Junposha, 2015); Samuels, 
Legislation Bureau, supra note 93, at 24 ("the decision to put Japanese boots on Iraqi 
ground ... was epochal"). 
130 Scholars cite a number of institutional and political reasons for this. See infra notes 
137-39. 
m Notwithstanding its deference to the legislature, the Supreme Court has been 
willing to review voting power imbalances under the equal protection provisions of 
the Constitution. As redistricting legislation has not kept abreast of the large shift of 
the Japanese population from rural to urban areas, the Court has weighed in on the 
constitutionality of the apportionment rules under electoral laws, finding the 
apportionment schemes of two such laws unconstitutional. However, the Diet has 
failed to act on such findings and the Court has not enforced its holdings nor has it 
invalidated the results of any elections. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS 
The process of adaptation that has been characterized by this 
combination of judicial inaction and exercise of legislative power and 
bureaucratic authority are symptomatic of certain elements of pre-war 
practices that have carried over into the post-war political structure. 
These characteristics shed light on some of the institutional factors 
affecting the reform process. 
The Supreme Court has been widely recognized, and criticized 
in some quarters, for its reluctance to exercise its power of judicial 
review over governmental actions. m As part of the dismantling of the 
pre-war political structure, the constitution elevated the judiciary to a 
co-equal branch of government and expressly granted the power of 
judicial review to the Supreme Court. m However, in its entire post-war 
history the Supreme Court has held only ten laws as unconstitutional on 
their face and approximately twelve as unconstitutional in their 
application.134 
Lower courts, on the other hand, while still generally reluctant 
to challenge government action, have been willing to go further than the 
Supreme Court in exercising such powers in certain cases. For example, 
several have either directly held laws or government action to violate 
Article 9 or have expressed opinions, supported by extensive analysis, 
supporting such a view. m However, they have not stood as binding 
m See Law, Judicial Review, supra note 76, at 1426 (" ... the ... Supreme Court of Japan 
... strikes down government actions so rarely that the judicial enforcement of 
constitutional limits on government power exists more in theory than in practice."). 
133 NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81 (Japan) ("The Supreme 
Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any 
law, order, regulation or official act."). 
134 JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 35, at 165-67. In contrast, during the same time 
period as the existence of the Japanese Supreme Court, the German equivalent has 
struck down over 600 laws and the U.S. Supreme Court, with a docket similar in size, 
has struck down over 900 laws. Law, Judicial Review, supra note 76, at 1426. In an 
early decision disposing of a challenge to the creation of the Self Defense Forces as a 
violation of Article 9, the Supreme Court adopted a "cases and controversies" 
requirement for constitutional disputes. Suzuki v. Japan, 6 Minshu 9, 783 (Sup. Ct. 
Oct. 8, 1952). Thereafter, Japanese courts have not opined on constitutional issues in 
the absence of controversies ripe for judicial resolution. Unlike other civil law 
countries Japan does not have a constitutional court with authority to decide such 
questions in the abstract. See infra note 165. 
m Ito et al v. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries [The Naganuma Nike 
Missile Site Case I], 7I2Hanrei Jiho 24 (Sapporo D. Ct., Sept. 7, 1973); Mori v. Japan, 
Heisei 19 (ne) 58 (Nagoya High Ct., Apr. 17, 2008) [hereinafter, "Nagoya High Court 
Case"]. 
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judgments as a result of the constitutional claims being disposed of on 
procedural or jurisdictional grounds, or being overturned on appeal.136 
A number of views have been expressed about possible reasons 
for judicial deference to the government on constitutional questions. m 
Scholars have noted that the judiciary is a standalone bureaucracy 
populated by career jurists whose court assignments are determined by 
the personnel decisions of the Supreme Court Secretariat. 138 A 
successful career culminating in appointments to desirable assignments 
in the most prestigious courts, including the Supreme Court, is 
determined by performance as judged by the personnel department of 
the Secretariat, who are themselves ultimately accountable to the 
Director General of the Secretariat and the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, who are political appointeeS.139 
The void created by judicial inaction in interpreting the 
constitution has been filled by a small, elite unit under the jurisdiction 
of the Cabinet. 140 The Cabinet Legislation Bureau (the "CLB") 
evaluates, screens and processes legislation proposed by the 
136 Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries v. Ito et al [The Naganuma Nike 
Missle Site Case II], 27 Gyosai Reishu 1175 (Sapporo High Ct., Aug. 5, 1976). See 
Hudson Hamilton, Mori v. Japan: The Nagoya High Court Recognizes the Right to 
Live in Peace, 19 PAC. RIML. & POL'Y J. 549 (2010); Library of Congress Report, 
supra note 127, at 34-35. See infra note 181. 
m They include conservative LDP dominance over Supreme Court and other judicial 
appointments, the constitutionally mandated, supreme lawmaking powers of the Diet, 
civil law principles limiting the judiciary to the application, not creation, oflaw, and 
the constitutional vetting role of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (discussed infra, text 
at notes 138-148). Law, Judicial Review, supra note 76, at 1428-62; JONES & 
RAVITCH, supra note 35, at 167-72. 
138 J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmussen, Why Are Japanese Judges So 
Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?, AM. POL. Ser. REV. 331, 334 (2001) 
[hereinafter, "Ramseyer & Rasmussen"]; KENNETH L. PORT ET AL., COMPARATIVE 
LAW: LAW AND THE PROCESS OF LAW IN JAPAN 257 (Durham: Carolina Academic 
Press, 3rd ed. 2015) [hereinafter, "PORT ET AL."]. 
139 JONES &RAVITCH, supra note 35, at 171; Law, Judicial Review, supra note 76, at 
1448-51; Ramseyer & Rasmussen, supra note 138, at 334 n.6. But see JOHN 0. 
HALEY, THE JAPANESE JUDICIARY: MAINTAINING INTEGRITY, AUTONOMY, AND THE 
PUBLIC TRUST, in DANIEL H. FOOTE, LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99, 114 
(University ofWashingtonPress, 2007) (" ... judges in Japan ... enjoy a greater degree 
of independence from political intrusion than in any other industrial democracy, both 
with respect to individual cases as well as the composition of the judiciary .... "). 
140 Martin, Informal Amendment, supra note 25, at 469-70; JONES & RAVITCH, supra 
note 35, at 59; Samuels, Legislation Bureau, supra note 93 ("Because of this ... 
jurisprudential void, ... the CLB has emerged as a quasi-constitutional court with a de 
facto monopoly on interpreting the constitution."). 
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government through its various Ministries.141 Initially disbanded during 
the Allied Occupation which regarded it as embodying an undesirable 
concentration of political power, 142 it was re-established immediately 
after the Allied Occupation ended.143 It is staffed by highly regarded 
career bureaucrats from various top ministries as well as prosecutors and 
judges. It has earned a reputation over the decades as a rigorous, high 
quality gatekeeper of government-sponsored legislation. 144 In the 
period between 1947 and 2005, only one law it has examined has been 
ruled unconstitutional, 14s and among the ten cases in which the Supreme 
Court found a law unconstitutional, most have been Diet-, not Cabinet-
originated.146 
The significance of the CLB's role is underscored by its function 
in advising the Cabinet on constitutional issues and, by extension, the 
Diet on behalf of the government. It has played a central role in various 
interpretations of legislation or executive authority adopted by the 
government during the post-war years.147 The Director General of the 
CLB is one of the five top bureaucrats permitted to assist the Prime 
Minister and other Ministers during Diet sessions when they are 
questioned about the interpretation of the constitution or other laws.14s 
The limited role played by the Supreme Court in adjudicating 
constitutional questions makes the interpretations expressed by the 
government, whether through the CLB, the Prime Minister or other 
Ministers with the assistance of the CLB, carry significant weight.149 
141 Naisei Kyoku Setchi Ho [Cabinet Legislation Bureau Establishment Law] 1952; 
Samuels, Legislation Bureau, supra note 93, at 5; JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 35, 
at 58. The significance ofthis role is underscored by the fact that only about 10% of 
laws passed by the Diet actually originate within the Diet (as opposed to Cabinet-
sponsored legislation). JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 35, at 128. The average passage 
rate for legislation submitted by the Cabinet has consistently exceeded 80% during the 
post-war period. Id. at 140. 
142 JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 35, at 58. During the period from 1945 to 1952 it 
had been moved under the Ministry of Justice. Yamamoto, Constitutional 
Interpretation, supra note 54, at 109. 
143 Samuels, Legislation Bureau, supra note 93, at 4. 
144 Id. at 4-5; JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 35, at 57-58. 
14s Samuels, Legislation Bureau, supra note 93, at 7; Library of Congress Report, 
supra note 127, at 17. 
146 JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 35, at 171. 
147 Goodman, Contemplated Amendments, supra note 89, at 66; Samuels, Legislation 
Bureau, supra note 93, at 5. 
148 JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 35, at 59. 
149 JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 35, at 59; Goodman, Contemplated Amendments, 
supra note 89, at 66 (" ... the opinions of the CLB are given great weight by all 
branches of the government-legislative, executive and judicial. It has been suggested 
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And where the judiciary has not expressed a view or declined to express 
a view on constitutional questions, its interpretation is effectively 
final.1so 
During the pre-war years the judiciary was under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Justice, and accordingly was subordinated to the 
executive and legislative branches.1s1 The predecessor of the CLB, the 
Legislation Bureau, in addition to having broad powers of review over 
acts of every Ministry as well as the Emperor's Privy Council, also 
housed the highest administrative court.1s2 This effectively positioned it 
as the sponsor, arbiter and reviewer of all pre-war legislation, 
facilitating control over the legislative process.1s3 Although the drafters 
of the post-war constitution sought to reorient this political structure, 1s4 
there is a reasonable basis to question whether judicial deference and 
continuing LDP political dominance over the legislative and executive 
branches echo at least some elements of the pre-war political structures 
and practices.1ss 
TENSIONS CREATED BY INCREMENTAL ADAPTATION 
Although a number of provisions in the Japanese constitution 
have been subject to a process of incremental adaptation, and others 
that opinions of the CLB are so significant that the Supreme Court of Japan follows 
them rather than its own view."). 
150 JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 35, at 57. 
151 Law, Judicial Review, supra note 76, at 1435. Under the Meiji Constitution, the 
Supreme Court of Judicature (the predecessor of the Supreme Court) did not have 
power of judicial review over legislation or regulations. JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 
35, at 165. 
152 Samuels, Legislation Bureau, supra note 93, at 3-4. 
153 During this period the Director General of the Legislation Bureau was often a 
sitting member of the Diet. Samuels, Legislation Bureau, supra note 93, at 8. 
154 Law, Judicial Review, supra note 76, at 1435; PORT ET AL., supra note 138, at 257. 
The evolution of the CLB into an independent and neutral arbiter of legislative and 
constitutional questions first emerged during the Allied Occupation as a reaction 
against efforts to strengthen the power of the Prime Minister over the civil 
bureaucracy. These efforts were resisted by CLB bureaucrats and since then, the 
relationship between the CLB and the Prime Minister has been marked by efforts by 
the CLB to maintain bureaucratic independence in the face of efforts by Prime 
Ministers to control and supervise the Ministries and Agencies. Samuels, Legislation 
Bureau, supra note 93, at 9. 
155 The Democratic Party of Japan after its election victory in 2009, in reacting to long-
standing criticism of the CLB 's role in assisting the Prime Minister or other Ministers 
in responding to Diet questions about the constitution or other laws as undemocratic 
executive control over the legislative process, declined to engage the services of the 
CLB during its tenure. JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 35, at 59. 
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have been proposed to fill perceived gaps, the discussions, debates and 
controversies surrounding the disarmament provisions of Article 9 have 
been the most visible to outside observers. 
The longstanding and extensive debates surrounding Article 9 
are prominent examples of the complex interaction of multiple aspects 
of the constitutional reform debate, and the struggle to reconcile 
interpretative conflicts arising from incremental adaptation. 156 
Japanese responses to the constraints imposed by the provision illustrate 
the tendency of the judiciary to defer to bureaucratic actions and the 
ability of a long-entrenched political class to assert policy through 
constitutional interpretation rather than formal amendment. 157 The 
dilemmas giving rise to the debates illustrate the unintended 
consequences arising from attempts to shape a conservative society to a 
liberal order based on democratic ideals and the struggle to adapt 
constitutional pacifism to changing international circumstances. 
The origins of Article 9 illustrate how quickly the text of the 
post-war constitution created challenges after enactment. 158 
Instructions to the original GHQ drafters contemplated a complete 
renunciation of war and exclusive reliance on the goodwill of the 
156 See Samuels, Legislation Bureau, supra note 93, at 7 (" ... no portion of the 
Constitution has been more hotly contested than Article IX and no issue has been more 
"political" than the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces"). 
157 In contrast, the Supreme Court has been more willing to exercise judicial 
interpretation to define permissible exercise of rights under the document in social and 
cultural contexts. These cases include those involving constitutional rights to religious 
freedom and freedom of expression. See, e.g., Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi, 31 Minshu 533 
(Sup. Ct. July 13, 1977) (religious freedom); Japan v. Nakaya, 42 Minshu 277 (Sup. 
Ct. June 1, 1988) (religious freedom); Kimigayo Case, 61 Minshu 291 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 
27, 2007) (freedom of expression); Japan v. Osawa 28 Keishu 9 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 6, 
1974) (freedom of expression). 
15s See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (description of the issues that the 
pacifist and democratic ideals of the document created for the U.S. during the Cold 
War). The text of Article 9 reads: 
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on 
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means 
of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea 
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized. 
NIHONKOKUKENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9, para. 2 (Japan). 
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international community for Japan's defense, 1s9 thereby seemingly 
precluding the maintenance of arms or use of force even for self-
defense.160 
During the course of the negotiations, it evolved into a version 
which was to permit room for interpretation of the question ofindividual 
self-defense.161 SCAP was willing to concede that notwithstanding the 
apparent ban on the maintenance of land, sea and air forces as well as 
"other war potential," Japan would be permitted to maintain such forces 
for defensive purposes.162 However, in struggling to explain how the 
right of self-defense could be consistent with the prohibition against 
arms, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida stated during the pre-
promulgation 1946 Diet debate that, although there was nothing that 
directly denied the right of individual self-defense, the prohibition on 
maintaining "war potential" had such eff ect.163 
1s9 1 TAKAYANAGI ET AL., supra note 16, at xxxii-xxxiii. 
160 The so-called "MacArthur Note", which was the basis upon which the first U.S. 
draft of the constitution was produced, provided for Japan to renounce war "even for 
preserving its own security". This went further than the official policy statement of 
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, SWNCC-228 (Jan. 7, 1946), which 
contemplated the establishment of a new military under civilian control. Library of 
Congress Report, supra note 127, at 6-7. The phrase was excluded from the first draft 
that was presented by GHQ to the Japanese govermnent. Id. at 7-8. MacArthur would 
later say that nothing in Article 9 was intended to prevent Japan from taking measures 
to preserve its own security. REMINISCENCES, supra note 8, at 304; 1 TAKAYANGIET 
AL., supra note 16, at xxxiii; Quigley, Revising the Constitution, supra note 18, at 141. 
161 See 2 TAKAYANAGI ET AL., supra note 16, at 143-45 (tracing the evolution of the 
language of the provision); Library of Congress Report, supra note 127, at 8-9 
(describing the amendments proposed by the Constitutional Amendment Committee 
of the Diet, chaired by Hitoshi Ashida, permitting this reinteipretation (the "Ashida 
amendments")). 
162 McNelly, Constitutional Reform, supra note 11, at 93 ("Whitney concurred in this 
interpretation [that the textual modifications would permit Japan to maintain defense 
forces] and agreed that this ... was 'acceptable"'). The increasing social, political and 
security concerns that emerged during the immediate years after adoption revealed the 
tensions between the document's aspirations and geopolitical realities. With the onset 
of the Korean War and escalating concerns about the growing communist threat, 
complete demilitarization of Japan was quickly ruled out of the question by the U.S. 
Library of Congress Report, supra note 127, at 10-12. 
163 See YOSHIYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 193-94 (University of 
Tokyo Press, 1976) (quoting Prime Minister Yoshida: "The article ... does not directly 
deny the right to legitimate defense, but since its second paragraph suppresses all 
rearmament ... the result is that the Constitution has renounced all sorts of war, even 
those undertaken as ... legitimate defense .... "). McNelly, Constitutional Reform, 
supra note 11, at 95 ("Notwithstanding the Ashida amendments ... Prime Minister 
Yoshida and his govermnent maintained their inteipretation that Article 9 forbade even 
defensive war and arms."). 
34 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW [Vol. 33:5 
The Supreme Court first weighed in on the war potential 
question in a 1952 case that challenged the constitutionality of the 
National Police Reserve,164 the predecessor to the SDF. In declining to 
address the issue, the Court dismissed the case based on lack of 
standing.16s This would be one of only two cases in which the Supreme 
Court would express a view on Article 9,166 and would establish a 
pattern for judicial responses to Article 9 adjudication. 
Contemporaneously, the CLB construed the National Police Reserve's 
military capabilities as being insufficient to constitute "war potential" 
within the meaning of Article 9, beginning a separate line of 
bureaucratic interpretation.167 
The tension between the prohibitions of the disarmament clause 
and political necessity was highlighted by the debates preceding 
enactment of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security 
Treaty in 1952.168 Each treaty explicitly recognized Japan's right to 
individual and collective self-defense and expressed the expectation that 
164 The National Police Reserve, established in 1950, was reorganized as the National 
Safety Force in 1952. Library of Congress Report, supra note 127, at 14; Yamamoto, 
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 54, at 105. 
165 Suzuki v. Japan, 6 Minshu 9, 783 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 8, 1952). See PORT ET AL., supra 
note 138, at 249 (citing Herbert F. Bolz, Judicial Review in Japan: The Strategy of 
Restraint, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 87 (1980)) (stating the Court noted 
Article 81 of the Constitution only refers to a "court of last resort", reasoning that co-
equality among the three branches of govermnent limited its power to considering only 
constitutional questions raised in concrete legal disputes and not in the abstract). This 
case, together with the lack of the traditional powers of a constitutional court, has 
formed the basis for the Supreme Court's refusal to exercise its power of judicial 
review in the absence of a case or controversy. 
166 See infra notes 175-76. 
167 Samuels, Legislation Bureau, supra note 93, at 11. 
16s The San Francisco Peace Treaty formally ended hostilities between Japan and its 
other signatories (which did not include the Soviet Union and China). Treaty of Peace 
with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169; T.I.A.S. No. 2490; 136 U.N.T.S. 45 
[hereinafter, "San Francisco Peace Treaty"], http://www.taiwandocuments.org/ 
sanfranciscoOl.htm. The US-Japan Security Treaty was entered into the same day. 
Bilateral Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan, September 
8, 1951 [hereinafter, "US-Japan Security Treaty"]. It granted to the U.S. rights to 
maintain bases in Japan and to use them not only for the defense of Japan, but also for 
the maintenance of regional and domestic security. US-Japan Security Treaty, art. 1. 
The latter rights were subsequently revised as part of the 1960 renewal of the Treaty. 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and 
Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632; T.I.A.S. No. 4500, art. VI, 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/l.html. 
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Japan would assume responsibility for its own defense. 169 This 
highlighted the continuing need to resolve the inherent conflict between 
these commitments and the 1946 interpretation of Article 9 regarding 
individual self-defense. It also formally introduced an additional level 
of complexity with its express recognition of Japan's right of collective 
self-defense. This was significant in the context of the new U.S.-Japan 
alliance, because it raised questions about the ability of Japan to come 
to the aid of the U.S. in the event of military conflict.no 
The first notable bureaucratic reinterpretation of Article 9 
therefore occurred during the 1954 debates on the Self Defense Forces 
Law,m pursuant to which the SDF was formally established, and the 
US-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (the "MSA 
Agreement") m entered into force during the same year. The Japanese 
government, through a CLB interpretation, resolved the interpretative 
question about self-defense by taking the position that although the right 
of individual self-defense is recognized as the right of all sovereign 
nations, the use of force in exercising such right must be limited under 
Article 9 to the extent "minimally necessary."m On the question of 
collective self-defense, it reaffirmed the principle that although Japan 
has a "right" to collective self-defense, it is prohibited from "exercising" 
such right. 174 Thus, the apparent conflicts between constitutionally 
mandated disarmament and Japan's treaty obligations were addressed 
by administrative interpretations that were to become the position of the 
Japanese government for almost 60 years. 
169 San Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 168, Article 5(c); US-Japan Security 
Treaty, supra note 168, preamble. Library of Congress Report, supra note 127, at 13-
14. 
110 See Library of Congress Report, supra note 127, at 21-23 (describing the debates 
in the Diet at the time the Peace Treaty and US-Japan Security Treaty were being 
considered, during which the govermnent for the first time formally took the position 
that while Japan had a collective defense right, it "had decided against war potential 
under Article 9" - i.e., declines to exercise such right). 
111 Jieitaiho [Self Defense Forces Law], Law No. 165 of 1954 (Japan). 
m Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United States of America and 
Japan, March 8, 1954, 5 U.S.T. 661; Nihonkoku to Amerika Gasshukoku to no Aida 
no Sogo Boei Enjo Kyotei, Treaty No. 6 of 1954, 
http://people.unica.it/annamariabaldussi/files/2015/04/USA-Japan-Treaty-1954.pdf. 
113 Library of Congress Report, supra note 127, at 16. 
114 Library of Congress Report, supra note 127, at 15, 22. At the same time the SDF 
law was passed, the Upper House also passed the Resolution on the Ban on 
Dispatching the SDF Abroad in order to address concerns that the MSA Agreement 
would lead Japan to dispatch the SDF not to defend Japan, but for the collective 
defense of an ally. Id. at 15. 
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Notwithstanding these clarifications, social and political 
disputes generated by opposing views of Japan's treaty obligations with 
the U.S. and its constitutional constraints gave the Supreme Court its 
second opportunity to formally address Article 9. 17s Although it 
reaffirmed in non-binding dicta that Japan has an inherent right to self-
defense, in its only statement to date addressing the constitutionality of 
the provision, it chose to interpret the grant of rights to maintain U.S. 
war potential on Japanese soil under the Treaty as a "political" question 
beyond the scope of judicial review in the absence of a "clear" and 
unmistakable violation of Article 9 .176 
Since then, there have been at least four notable expansions of 
governmental interpretations of Article 9, in each case related to 
legislation passed in response to geopolitical events recognizing that 
such responses were required to address the changing requirements of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan's own security interests. m All of 
these interpretative expansions have taken place since the mid-1990s 
and have been initiated by the Japanese government.178 These events 
11s At the time of its decision, these disputes between the left and right were building 
up to explosive conflict during the US-Japan Security Treaty renewal debates of 1960. 
The right, chafing under the continuing presence of U.S. bases, recognized their 
presence was necessary for the continued freedom to focus on the economic recovery 
of the country. The left vehemently objected to Japan's continuing partnership with 
the U.S. and the fear of entanglement in overseas conflicts. The conflict led to the 
resignation of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, but not before he forced through the 
renewal. PYLE, AMERICAN CENTURY, supra note 8, at 200-06. 
116 Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 1959) [Showa 34 (A) 710]. 
m The first of these came after the Gulf War when the Peace Keeping Operation Law 
("PKO Law") was passed in 1992 (which permitted the dispatch of SDF personnel 
abroad for humanitarian puiposes but prohibited the use of force). The Second came 
in 1999 and arose in the wake of North Korean missile launches in 1993 and its nuclear 
build-up in 1994-1996 (extending Japanese military activity to "rear area" support of 
U.S. forces - i.e., the public sea and air above Japan -- but avoided the issue of "use 
of force" under the principle of non-integration with the military force of a foreign 
country). The third reinteipretation came in connection with a series of laws arising 
from the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror in 2003 and 2004 (permitting 
dispatch of SDF troops to countries engaged in ongoing hostilities, but prohibiting 
deployment in specific hostile areas of such countries, and expanding the definition of 
"rear area" to remove geographic restrictions while continuing limitations on the use 
of force). The fourth change in interpretation came in 2013 (maintaining the policy 
that Article 9 permits "use of force" to the minimum extent necessary for self-defense 
but expanding "use of force" situations to circumstances when an ally is attacked; i.e., 
permitting collective self-defense in such situations, but subject to strict conditions). 
See generally, Library of Congress Report, supra note 127, at 23-41. For the 
significance of the fourth reinterpretation, see infra text at notes 182-192. 
11s Library of Congress Report, supra note 127. 
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compelled the government to expand the role of the SDF, including 
deployment overseas, which fueled ongomg and intensifying 
constitutional debateS.179 
The courts have continued to hear challenges to the 
constitutionality of these governmental actions and various others 
related to Article 9 .1so However, the standard of deference established 
by the Supreme Court has continued to be reaffirmed.1s1 The result has 
been a gradual expansion of the substantive and geographic scope of 
permitted Japanese defense activity. 
During the course of these developments the CLB played a 
central role in providing the legal justification for the continued 
expansion of the interpretation of individual self-defense.1s2 However, 
it continued to draw the line on the prohibition against the exercise of 
the right to collective self-defense.1s3 
Amidst escalating tensions in Asia marked by successful nuclear 
tests in North Korea and territorial claims by China in the South China 
Sea, questions about the sustainability of the interpretative process, 
179 Id. 
180 John 0. Haley, supra note 76, at 1472 (Since 1947, Japanese courts have 
adjudicated at least two dozen cases related to the constitutionality of various measures 
under Article 9). 
181 As noted previously, lower court cases holding such acts unconstitutional have 
either decided such cases on different grounds or have had their holdings reversed by 
higher courts. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. The most significant 
of these was the Nagoya High Court Case, which in 2005 consolidated five of seven 
preliminary injunction actions against the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq under the Iraq 
Special Measures Law. The court stated in dicta that the Air SDF was operating in a 
combat area (the Baghdad Aiiport) and that the prohibition on use of force in effect at 
the time were violated by an impermissible integration of the Air SDF airlifts with the 
use of force of a foreign country. The government won the case on procedural grounds 
and the plaintiffs, although they lost, were satisfied with the moral victory and 
therefore chose not appeal. Library of Congress Report, supra note 127, at 34-35. 
The government has stated that it does not feel bound by the constitutional findings of 
the ruling. Id. at 35; Law, Judicial Review, supra note 76, at 1427 n.8. 
182 See Samuels, Legislation Bureau, supra note 93, at 9, 11 (arguing the CLB has 
jealously protected its bureaucratic turf as the guardian of constitutional interpretation 
against political pressure on a range of issues, including use of force: "there have been 
changes in national security policy and civil-military relations since 1945, and the 
CLB has always been right in the thick of things"). 
183 Samuels argues that by the time of the anti-terrorlegislation in 2003-2004, although 
official reinterpretation of the question was not to be stated until 2014, "[c]ollective 
defense effectively was a new 'fact on the ground' ... " given the scope of Japanese 
military activity abroad. Id. at 22. 
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which had been building for years,184 finally peaked in 2014. After 
witnessing years of interpretations blocking the government's ability to 
respond with force to attacks on allies, 18s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
initiated a series of actions beginning with the replacement of the 
Director General of the CLB.186 This was followed in rapid succession 
by the resignation of the new Director General and the submission of a 
report from a separate governmental advisory panel charged with 
recommendations on how Article 9 should be reinterpreted, 187 
effectively removing the question from the CLB. A Cabinet resolution 
was then passed in July 2014, based upon which it issued a new 
interpretation of "use of force" under Article 9 to expressly permit 
collective self-defense.188 
The new policy was promptly implemented in a 2015 enactment 
of a comprehensive package of national security legislation which 
included the establishment of Japan's first National Security Council as 
184 See id. at 15-25 (describing increasing criticisms by politicians of the CLB and its 
interpretative positions on the limitations of the right to collective self-defense up to 
at least the period of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's tenure). 
185Id. at 14-15. 
186 Goodman, Contemplated Amendments, supra note 89, at 67; Martin, Informal 
Amendment, supra note 25, at 477; Yamamoto, Constitutional Interpretation, supra 
note 54, at 113. 
187 Martin, Informal Amendment, supra note 25, at 475-78. The Advisory Panel on 
the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security was established by Prime Minister 
Abe during his first term in 2007 to provide recommendations on how Article 9 should 
be reinterpreted. Its work was suspended upon his resignation but was revived upon 
his return to power in 2012, with a renewed and broadened mandate to update its prior 
report. Id. at 475-76. 
188 Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure 
Japan's Survival and Protect its People [Provisional Translation] (July 1, 2014), 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e _ 000273 .html. See also Library of Congress 
Report, supra note 127, at 37-39 ("The govermnent did not state that acts based on 
'collective self-defense' are permitted under Article 9. Rather, the govermnent 
expanded the standards of 'use of force' so that Japan can use force, if other conditions 
are met, when an ally of Japan is attacked.") The reasons for the new interpretation 
were stated to be "that the strategic environment around Japan had become more 
threatening, and that the govermnent's obligation to guarantee the security of the 
Japanese people required a more robust national security posture, and particularly the 
development of a more proactive role within the US-Japan security arrangements." 
Martin, Informal Amendment, supra note 25, at 4 78. 
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well as a state secrets law.1s9 Accompanied by a storm of criticism,190 
this legislation was the latest, perhaps most controversial interpretative 
stretch. Moreover, the circumstances and manner in which it was 
implemented have raised serious concerns about the limits and 
legitimacy of incremental adaptation. 191 This in tum has raised 
questions about the legitimacy of interpretative change, the appropriate 
limits of "informal constitutional amendments" and the desirability of a 
more formal process for change.192 
CONCLUSION 
With passage of the Amendment Procedures Law in 2007193 and 
its subsequent revisions in 2014,194 the basic legal framework has been 
established for conducting a public referendum on constitutional 
amendment proposals. Upper and Lower House committees have been 
established to debate and recommend proposals to the Diet. 19s The 
LDP, its coalition partners and opposition parties continue to navigate 
the strategic and tactical complexities of the political process.196 
Japan's responses to the constraints of Article 9 are one example 
of how institutional actors have adapted over time the seemingly 
1s9 Adam Liff & Andrew Erickson, From Management Crisis to Crisis Management? 
Japan's Post-2012 Institutional Reforms and Sino-Japanese Crisis (In)stability, 40 J. 
S1RATEGIC STUD. 604, 624-28 (2017); Christopher Hughes, Japan's Strategic 
Trajectory and Collective Self-Defense: Essential Continuity or Radical Shift?, 43 J. 
JAPANESE STUD. 93, 93-94 (2017). 
190 See SHEILA A. SMITH, JAPAN REARMED 155 (Harvard Univ. Press 2019) ("Diet 
deliberations over the legislation to implement this constitutional reinteipretation ... 
drew protests on a scale unprecedented since the 1960 demonstrations against the 
revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty"); Experts' Tongue-Lashing Rekindles Diet 
Debate on Reinterpreted Constitution, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 5, 2015. 
191 SMITH, supra note 190, at 163--64 ("it was clear that for many Japanese, the Abe 
cabinet's reinteipretation came dangerously close to overturning Article 9."). 
1n See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
193 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
194 NIHONKOKU KENPO No KAISEI TETUDUKI NI KANSURU HORITSU No ICHIBU Wo 
KAISEI SURU HORITSU [LAW PARTIALLY AMENDING THE LAW CONCERNING 
PROCEDURESFORAMENDMENTOFTHECONSTITUTIONOF JAPAN], Law No. 75, (2014). 
19s 100 votes in the Lower House and 50 votes in the Upper House are required to 
submit proposals for amendment in both Houses, but an absolute two-thirds majority 
is required to adopt amendment proposals. The Diet Law, ch. V-II, art. 68-II. 
196 For a comprehensive oveIView of the current political process, see CFR Info guide, 
Constitutional Change in Japan - The Politics of Revision - Evolving Proposals for 
Revision (2019), https ://www .cfr.org/interactive/japan-constitution/politics-of-
revision; see also Constitutional Reform Talks in Japan Slide to 2019, THE JAPAN 
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2019. 
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conflicting text of Japan's constitution to post-war realities. In the case 
of Article 9, judicial deference combined with bureaucratic 
interpretation have expanded the scope of the provision's textual 
limitations. This has occurred against the larger backdrop of adapting 
an essentially foreign document to domestic political and social 
practices, a process which has taken place in different contexts in 
accordance with judicial interpretations and legislative acts.197 
This combination of responses has permitted the Japanese 
constitution to adapt to shifting domestic and international changes with 
remarkable stability. Notwithstanding this process of adaptation (or 
perhaps in reaction to it), the Japanese public appears to have started to 
recognize the limitations of the document, and the need for more formal 
change.19s 
After decades of relative domestic and international stability 
between the 1960s and 1990s, a number of events have provided the 
LDP with a more credible basis to appeal for such change to larger 
segments of political leadership and the electorate. The rise of the North 
Korean nuclear threat in the mid-1990s followed by the Gulf War and 
the Global War on Terror, crises in the Taiwan straits, the emergence of 
China as an economic and strategic rival, the Kobe earthquake and 
Fukushima disasters, Imperial abdication, changing demands for social 
equality, and continuing voter disparity issues, have all increased the 
public dialogue about the desirability and possibility for constitutional 
reform. 
Finally, some continue to assert aspirations of self-
determination. It is a tribute to the democratic principles that have been 
established in Japan that full debates are taking their course in an open 
legislative and, possibly, public referendum process to resolve issues of 
timing and the scope of desired change. If reform does eventually occur, 
one could question whether it represents the beginning of a more 
fundamental alignment of the country with its historical roots and the 
first formal recognition of the limits of Western-imposed universalism, 
or the first small steps towards truly accepting the document as a natural 
instrument of national governance. 
197 See supra notes 69-7 5, 157 and accompanying text. 
19s See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. 
